ABSTRACT. The paper shows that all and only a-additive Popper measures can be, indeed uniquely, represented by so called dimensionally well-ordered families of a-additive probability measures.
Probabilities conditional on events having probability 0 cannot be defined within standard probability theory. Many considered this to be a serious defect and tried to do better. Essentially four ways to deal with this problem have emerged.
One method is due to Carnap; it consists in imposing his regularity condition on probability measures (cf. Carnap (1971 Carnap ( , 1980 , Section 7 and 21). However, this does not solve the problem; it is only a way of avoiding it as far as possible within standard probability theory. But the problem is unavoidable for measures on uncountable o-fields.
The second method is the standard one within mathematics. It consists in generalizing the concept of conditional probability, i.e. in defining probabilities (and expectations) conditional on e-fields (cf., e.g., Lo~ve (1960) , w w 24, 25). This method meets most of the needs of applied mathematics and should make us aware of the fact that the problem is a rather theoretical one. However , the probabilities conditional on oYfields are determined only almost uniquely (in the technical sense). Thus, I think, this method does not count as a fundamental solution of our problem.
Another method is to do probability theory within the framework of nonstandard analysis (cf. Loeb, 1979) . Within this framework division by infinitesimals is defined. Thus, if non-empty events get at least infinitesimal instead of zero probability, probabilities conditional on them can also be defined. Without doubt, this method should be taken seriously. But nonstandard analysis is a very intricate matter, and I won't dwell upon this method here.
The fourth method, developed independently by Popper and R~nyi, is the one I want to deal with. It consists in construing conditional probability not as a derived, but as a fundamental concept and in looking for a suitable set of axioms for it; absolute probabilities are then defined as probabilities conditional on the sure event. The simplest axiomatics that has emerged is comprised in the following definition: DEFINITION 1. Let ~2 be a non-empty set and S/, the set of events, a o-field of subsets of~2. Then (~2, >U,.~, P) is called a conditional probability space (e.p.s.} iff ~r the set of conditions, is a non-empty subset ofsU \{0} andP is a function from .W'x~ into the closed interval [0, 1]' such that the following holds:
(a) for each B E ~ the function P(. I B) is a o-additive probability measure on ~/with P(B I B) --1, (b) for each A, B, C E ~/with C, B n C E~-~:J we have
P(A n B I C) = P(A I B n C) . P(B I C).
(fY, ~/, .~, P) is called an additive conditional probability spaee iff we have moreover: (c) ifA, BE ~, then alsoA u BE~5 r.
(~2, ~-/,2 ,P) is a Popper space iff in addition to (a) and (b) we have (d) for each A C S', ifP(A [B) > 0 for some BE~, then A E3~. Finally, let's call (~2,~,~,P) a full conditional probability space iff in addition to (a) and (b) (e) .~T=.~\~ 0}. The function P of a c.p.s, is called, respectively, a (additive, full} conditional probability measure (c.p.m.) or a Popper measure.
Obviously, every full c.p.s, is a Popper space, and every Popper space is an additive c.p.s.
Some history: The definition of c.p.s.s is due to R~nyi (1955) . It scarcely needs any explanation; the point of clause (b) is, of course, to ensure the compatibility of probabilities with respect to varying conditions. The concept of an additive c.p.s, has also been invented by R6nyi; its role will become clear in Theorem 1 below. (This use of 'additive' has nothing to do with the usual addititivity of measures.) Popper spaces have, of course, been introduced by Popper; the axioms given by him in Popper (1959) , new appendices *ii *v, have been simplified by Stalnaker (1970) , Harper (1976), and van Fraassen (1976 In full c.p.s.s finally, there is no restriction to conditionalization at all.
I think the concept of a c.p.s, is an essentially satisfying solution to our problem, but I won't argue this, since I have no new reason for thinking so. The four concepts of a c.p.s. introduced above differ only in their demands on the set of conditions. I am not going to decide, which of these is the most preferable. But it is clear that the larger the set of conditions the fuller the solution to our problem.
C.p.m.s thus being useful and interesting, it is natural to ask how they relate to or may be constructed from usual (probability) measures. It is this question I want to deal with in this paper. For additive c.p.m.s, this question has been answered by Cs~szfir (1955) ; I shall reproduce his answer for introductory reasons as well as for the sake of completeness. With respect to Popper measures, I first thought that this question had been completely settled by van Fraassen (1976) , so that nothing would be left to say about it. However, this is not quite so.
Van Fraassen proves there that Popper measures may be represented by well-ordered families of probability measures. But his representation has two minor blemishes. First, the representation given by him is not unique; the closest to uniqueness he comes to is the representation by what he calls minimal families of probability measures; but only Popper spaces which satisfY a rather restrictive condition and which he then calls dimensional can be represented by such minimal families (cf. van Fraassen (1976) , p. 426). Secondly, the well-orderedness of a representing family is not substantial; what is essentially embodied in the representation is only a linear ordering of such a family (cf. p. 427, lines 5-7, and the theorem on p. 427).
As will become clear, these blemishes are due to the fact that van Fraassen is more generally concerned with finitely additive Popper measures (where clause (a) of Definition 1 is weakened to the effect that each P(. I B) is only finitely additive). Here every kind of measure will always be understood to be or-additive; and restricting ourselves in such a way, we are able to establish more elegant representations. It will also be clear that, despite these differences, the following has been strongly inspired by van Fraassen's paper.
What might it mean to represent or to generate a c.p.s.? A first idea is given by 
?(A I B) = ~i(A n B)I~i(B).
However, this notion of generation is still uninformative; trivially, each c.p.s, can be generated in such a way, as has already been observed by Cs~sz~r (1955) This is a most satisfying representation result for c.p.s.s in general, and it explains the special role of additive c.p.s.s. Of course, this result also applies to Popper spaces. But since Popper spaces have stronger properties, stronger representation results should be, and indeed are, obtainable for them. To these we shall work up now.
The first step is to strengthen the concept of dimensional ordering. (a, t3,7 , ..., ~" will in the sequel be used as variables for ordinal numbers.) Proof. Let (~ra)a< ~-and (rr~,)a<~., generate the same Popper space (~2, ~/, ~.~,P). We'll show by transfinite t induction that 7r a = rr a for all a < ~" and that ~" = ~". Thus, t suppose that t3 < ~', f' and rr a = lra for all a </3. We then 
~r'~(A n C) + ~r'~(A\C) = ~r'~(A I C) =P(A I C)
, and, similar-_ ly, ~r#(A) = P(A [ C) = Try(A). Finally, if ~" < f', there would be a C such that 7rb(C) = 1 and rr~(C) = 7ra(C) = 0 for all a < ~" and, hence, both C E .~r and not C E ~. ~" < ~" is impossible in the same way. So, ~" = ~". Q.E.D.
Our second aim is, of course, to reverse Theorem 3. This is a bit harder to get. For the following auxiliary definitions and lemmata we shall assume some fixed Popper space
LEMMA2. For all A, CEJ
and BE~ we have: if hence, {BE JIA ~B} = ~4\ J~'A. Remember that a e-ideal in 5S is a non-empty subset 2of~suchthatBE~ for allBCA, ifAE3,and Un ~N An E ~r , if An E 2 for all n EN. LEMMA 6. For each A E ~, 3~4 and 2~A are ~r-ideals in Proof. Suppose first that BE 3~4 and C C_B. This implies that B~A and C~B and, thus, by Lemma 4, C~A, i.e. CE ~2 A . Next suppose that Bn E "-~A for all nEN and B=Un~NB n. This means that for all hEN P(AIAuBn)>O. Since P(BIB)=I, there must be a mEN with P(Bm [B)>0. Lemma 2 yields P(A u Bm [ A u B) > 0. Therefore, we also have P(A I A u B) =P(A u Bm IA uB)"P(AIA u Bin)>0, i.e. B~A. This shows that ~A is a e-ideal in ~i Since the equivalence classes generated by ~ are well-ordered, there must be some B such that J~A = ~2B ; thus, SPA is also a o-ideal. Q.E.D.
and, thus, P(A u CIB u C)>IP((A u C) n B[B u C) =P(A u C [ B) 9 P(B
In fact, for A E ~ 2 A is of a rather special character: LEMMA 7. For each A E ~ there is a C E ~r such that 3~4 = {B E J I there is a B' E ~ with B C_ C u B'}. Proof. First, we have inf{P(A I A')I A' E ~2 A } > 0. Summarizing all these lemmata, we may define a wellordered sequence (~;~a)a<~'+l of or-ideals in 5r in the following way:
.r for some AE a }, and, in case a is a limit number, 3r = nt~ < ~ ~t~-For this sequence the following holds true: if/3 < a, then ,~a C jc~?~; each equivalence class generated by ~" is of the form ~;~2a\ /Yea + 1; ~ = J~\ ~;
and, finally, for each a < f there exists a C a E ~a such that ~a = ( 
on) = P(A t B). Q.E.D.
A simple corollary to this is THEOREM 6. A c.p.s, is full iff it is generated by a d.w.o. family (rra) a < i" of probability measures such that ~ is the only event A for which zra(A ) = 0 for all a < ~. This concludes our representation theorems for Popper measures. Retrospectively, it is quite clear why our oadditive Popper measures lend themselves to nicer representations than the finitely additive Popper measures investigated by van Fraassen (1976) . One crucial use of a-additivity was in proving in Lemma 5 that well-orderings inhere in Popper spaces. The other crucial use was in Lemma 6 which then led to Lemma 7; and Lemma 7 proves a property corresponding to van Fraassen's dimensionality of finitely additive Popper spaces which he had to presuppose for their representation by his minimal families. These are just the two points mentioned right before Definition 2.
As a sort of appendix, let me sketch the connection between this representation of Popper measures and conditional logic. That such a connection exists is to be expected-since conditionalization is essential both to conditional logic and probability theory-and in fact well known (cf., in particular, Stalnaker (1970) , Section 2, and Harper (1976) , Section II.2). With our representation, this connection may be made more perspicuous:
The concept fundamental to conditional logic is this: There is a realistic interpretation to g: B is true conditional on A (whatever this is to precisely mean) iffg(A) C B. Or a more easily graspable epistemic interpretation: B is believed conditional on A (by some person at a certain time) iffg(A) C_ B.
Several concepts of a selection function are in use, and it is well known that nearly every semantics for conditional logic is based on some such concept. The concept fixed in Definition 7 is the right one for our context, since there is a representation for it which, though being much simpler, resembles that of a Popper measure: 
Sketch of proof.
It is easily verified that the function g defined in this way is a selection function, conversely, define for a given selection function g by transfinite recursion: Ct~ = $2 \ U~<t3 g(Ca), and ~" = min{a I g(Ca) = 0 }.
Then it is again easily verified that (Ca)a < f + 1 is a selection sequence and the only one defining the given g in the specified way. Q.E.D.
In fact, this theorem is well known, since it is the core of the equivalence of a seSection functions semantics and a similarity spheres semantics for conditionals (cf. Lewis 1973, pp. 58f) .
Here, a selection sequence directly corresponds to the sequence of a-ideals defined just before Theorem 5. Thus,
